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CODIB-D-111/1.7/8
3 August 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Report of CODIB Task Team VII - Analyst Communication

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-39.7/6, 6 May 1964
b. CODIB-D-111/1.7/5, 7 April 1967 (Attached)

A. Background.

This is a report on the study undertaken by CODIB's Task Team VII, Analyst Communication, pursuant to USIB direction contained in Reference a. The task team was chaired by a representative of the Department of State with additional members from DIA and CIA. The objectives of the task team were to: (a) study present practices and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and, if required, to develop proposals to facilitate the exchange between analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and expertise, and (b) to determine the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program of improvement. The study was confined to those components of USIB agencies in the Washington, D.C., area which produce current, basic or estimative finished intelligence. For practical reasons the team concentrated its study on one geographic area (viz., Latin America); however, the problems were discussed with a number of analysts in other geographic and functional areas. The team felt that the coverage was sufficiently broad to validate the views set forth in its report.

B. Summary of Task Team Findings.

The task team found that while the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication was generally more satisfactory than

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had been presumed when the team was organized, there remains room for improvement. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Such communication is not generally undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. Although present facilities and procedures enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with analysts in another agency, there are many inadequacies, and the cumulative effect of these is a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication. The only communication system fully accessible to all analysts is the black, insecure telephone. While it should not be used for classified discussions or to transmit classified information, the task team reported that it is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters.*

The NSA secure telephone (gray phone) system is available only to analysts with special clearance, which many in DIA and State do not have. The instruments are located only in restricted areas, in many cases remote from a large number of analysts who do have the proper clearance. Furthermore, the gray phone system should be used only to discuss SIGINT materials. Expansion of this system would be both expensive and difficult and is not planned at present. Teletype and LDX (Long Distance Xerography) are available to a limited extent but use of these mechanisms is time-consuming and cumbersome, and the analysts must leave their desks and files in order to use them. Just at the time a particular analyst needs to communicate with another the equipment may be engaged in priority communications. Furthermore, DIA is not yet in the LDX network.

The KY-3 (green) phone system, in use now and being expanded for secure voice communication between key offices in the Washington area (i.e., White House, State, DoD and CIA), offers considerable promise for alleviating the present deficiency in facilities for analyst-to-analyst secure communication. The KY-3 system will connect at the Pentagon with the worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications system (AUTOSEVOCOM) which also uses KY-3 terminals in the Washington area. Out-of-town offices on the AUTOSEVOCOM net will generally use a narrow band HY-2 terminal, but clusters of out-of-town subscribers may also use KY-3's to converse with each other because of better voice quality on KY-3's. There are now about 100 KY-3 terminals in CIA, 30 in State,

*The Army and Navy have no basis for supporting this statement in that the Army and Navy did not participate as members of Task Team VII and their analysts were not queried concerning use of insecure phones for discussion of classified matters.

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and about 220 in or planned for DoD Washington offices. Others are planned for CIA and State. DIA has two KY-3 terminals at present. Others are planned for installation in 1967 in both Arlington Hall and the Pentagon. Seven additional secure telephone outlets can be attached to a KY-3 terminal at a cost of about \$1800 per terminal. The lines can be extended up to 1,000 feet from the terminal provided they are given adequate security protection. These additional "green" phones, if located in the analysts' working areas, would greatly improve the present analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities. The task team recommends that this be done in the Washington area wherever feasible.

The task team found no enthusiasm by analysts for a centralized directory service and concluded that it could not be justified because of the security problems involved, the cost and the difficulty of establishing and maintaining such a service. In lieu thereof, the team felt that increased access to listings of key personnel, organizational charts, and telephone directories of the various agencies would aid significantly in identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency.

The task team believes that the use of closed circuit television techniques could be developed into a useful means of analyst-to-analyst communication especially between photo interpreters and general analysts. The feasibility of these techniques has been demonstrated. However, application to real-life situations requires further effort which the task team recommends be undertaken.

The task team reports that there may be unprecedented progress in the field of secure communications in the next few years. Therefore, it believes that continuous liaison is necessary between managers of major analysis activities and those responsible for planning and developing secure voice systems in order to take full advantage of new developments in terms of improved analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities.

C. CODIB Comment.

25X1 In view of the fact that the intelligence community is now housed is over [] buildings in the Washington area, we believe that there is much to be gained by improving, through concerted community effort, the mechanisms by which analysts in one agency or building can make contact with analysts in another agency or building and discuss classified matters. The temptation is very great to use the insecure

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telephone, which is on virtually every analyst's desk, for discussion of classified matters, especially when the only alternative is a time-consuming personal visit to discuss a matter that would require only a short telephone conversation. We believe that the secure voice and other communications media available to analysts are far from satisfactory. We agree with the task team that the "green" phone system offers good prospects for immediate improvement.

We have learned recently that a small, portable, relatively low-cost device (Magnafax 840 Facsimile Transceiver) is now available commercially and can be used in conjunction with a telephone to transmit either text or graphic materials at any security level for which the telephone is approved. We believe that use of devices of this type warrants consideration.

We agree with the task team, but not necessarily for the same reasons, that a directory service to assist in identifying and contacting analysts is not warranted at this time. We feel that we should not place any greater temptation before the analysts than they now have to use the insecure phone system for classified conversations. We view with some alarm the situation reported by the task team that the insecure phone system is used widely and extensively to discuss classified matters. Steps should be taken immediately to remedy the condition which makes this practice a virtual necessity. We believe that the problem of a directory service should be examined again after there has been an improvement in the facilities for secure voice communication between analysts in different buildings. In the meantime, the existing liaison staffs should be permitted to secure and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks from the other agencies as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying and locating the appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies. In this regard we note that CIA no longer maintains a liaison officer at Arlington Hall where the bulk of DIA analysts are located.

We believe that there is considerable advantage to be gained from application of closed circuit television techniques to the analysis and communication of intelligence. However, we cannot foresee all of the gains with sufficient clarity at this time to warrant recommending priority effort.

We have learned since the task team completed its report that the Army Electronics Command, as executive agent for the Defense Communications Agency, has had an extensive and successful program underway to

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develop equipment and techniques for secure transmission of video signals over lines used for commercial TV. The prototype equipment and techniques have been developed and tested and are operationally satisfactory. The cost at the present time is rather high, on the order of \$1 million per pair of terminals. We have asked the Army Electronics Command and the Defense Communications Agency to keep us informed of further developments and/or plans for installation of any secure video systems. We will examine these to see whether they might be used or extended into appropriate areas to enhance analyst-to-analyst communications.

D. Recommendations.

We recommend that USIB:

1. Request its member agencies participating in the KY-3 (green) secure voice communications system in the Washington area to examine the locations of existing and planned KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communications capabilities between buildings and agencies, and that they give this matter priority attention so as to alleviate as soon as possible the current situation in which the commercial telephone system is the only one available to a large percentage of the analysts.

2. Request the member agencies to assure continuing participation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of those people concerned with the development and installation of secure communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.

3. Endorse the principle that the liaison staffs of the various agencies should be permitted to obtain and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key personnel and handbooks as are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying appropriate analysts and sources of information in the other agencies.

4. Note the attached report of CODIB Task Team VII.

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Chairman

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Attachment:

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7 April 1967

U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D
C O M M I T T E E O N D O C U M E N T A T I O N

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

FINAL REPORT

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CODIB-D-111/1.7/5
7 April 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Documentation

SUBJECT : Final Report of CODIB Task Team VII, Analyst
Communication

1. Transmitted herewith is the report of Task Team VII, Analyst Communication.

2. It will be noted that the Task Team concludes that the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication is more satisfactory than had first been presumed when the Task Team was constituted. This generally, more satisfactory situation, it is believed, can be attributed to the increasing maturity and sophistication of the intelligence community in general, to the strengthening, over the past years, of the various organs of coordination, particularly USIB and its committees, and to a growing realization on the part of each agency of the benefits to be derived from cooperation and collaboration. It is primarily these factors, rather than the existence or non-existence of specific facilities, that govern the extent and effectiveness of analyst-to-analyst communication. However, there are a few areas where improvement can be accomplished. These have been indicated in the report. The Task Team is especially hopeful that newly reported developments may prove of real assistance in reducing the problem of secure voice communications.

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

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Terms of Reference

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A. Scope of the Problem

1. In accordance with its Terms of Reference (CODIB-D-111/1.7/2), Task Team VII considered the problem of communication between analysts who, in their respective agencies, are engaged in the production and coordination of positive intelligence. It did not address itself to the problems of communication between analysts in different components of the same agency or to ways and means of improving communication between intelligence analysts and collectors* or between intelligence analysts and operations and policy elements in other agencies.

2. In approaching its problem, the Task Team initially sought to obtain an understanding of the actual, present situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication. Since actual day to day practices are greatly affected by the working habits of analysts and are, to a high degree, subjective matters, a comprehensive survey of all analysts concerned, through a questionnaire technique, was considered not warranted. Instead, the Task Team members discussed analyst-to-analyst communications with representative analysts in their respective agencies. These personal interviews were guided by a series of questions which the Task Team had developed in advance.

3. The intelligence organizations thus surveyed were the producing organizations in Washington, D.C., specifically: the research offices in INR, most of the offices under the DDI in CIA, and elements of DIA under the Assistant Director for Intelligence Production. For practical reasons, the Task Team concentrated on a single geographical area (viz., Latin America) and discussed all aspects of analyst communication with a substantial number of individuals working in this field. However, it also discussed the problem of improving analyst-to-analyst communication with a broad spectrum of intelligence officers in other geographic and functional areas and took their views into account in preparing this report. Total coverage, in the view of Task Team VII and of the officers consulted, was sufficiently inclusive to validate the views set forth herein.

B. Purposes Served by Analyst-to-Analyst Communication

1. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Both purposes may be involved in any particular instance of analyst-to-analyst communication.

*It should also be noted that, by its Terms of Reference, Task Team VII is not concerned with problems of information handling, processing, identification, recording, storage, and retrieval.

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2. When analysts communicate to exchange views and judgments they are usually concerned with current developments, but from time to time they also discuss other topics of mutual interest. In either case, the analysts are typically "opposite numbers" or counterparts--that is, they work in essentially the same area or functional specialty in their respective agencies and are familiar with the current information pertaining to their specialty. Thus, communication is generally initiated to get a counterpart's interpretation of the facts, or to check one's own interpretation, rather than to acquire additional data or background information.

3. Communication for the second purpose, i.e., to obtain information, on the other hand, usually involves analysts working in different areas or specialties. For example, a political analyst may need detailed information about military matters or a Latin American specialist may require statistical data which other agencies regularly compile. When an analyst needs information on a subject outside his field he initially seeks assistance from his colleagues in his own agency, but in many cases he knows in advance that the kind of information sought can be obtained only from knowledgeable officers in other agencies. The information itself is sometimes obtained orally, in which case analyst-to-analyst communication has served its purpose without any documents being obtained; however, communication may also be little more than an inquiry about the information sought and the information itself may be acquired in the form of a memorandum prepared specifically for the purpose of answering the inquiry or by reference to documents which the analyst obtains through normal channels.

4. The Task Team found that analyst-to-analyst communication is generally not undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. In the current intelligence field, analysts recognize that each agency will decide whether or not to publish its interpretation of current events on grounds other than the avoidance of duplication. It is established practice, of course, for designated intelligence officers to coordinate items in the daily issuances of the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA with their opposite numbers, but communication between analysts for the express purpose of obtaining formal concurrence on a current intelligence topic is otherwise very rare. Moreover, informal communication between analysts is not the normal procedure for producing a coordinated intelligence estimate or an agreed judgment. The well-known mechanisms for producing NIEs and USIB Committee papers may involve analyst communication in an incidental way, but the group discussion of a common draft, in this context, is primarily for coordination purposes and not for the type of analyst communication that is addressed in this report.

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C. Existing Practices and Facilities

1. There is considerable variation in the extent to which analysts know their counterparts in other agencies, and various other intelligence officers, who are sources of information in related fields. As a general rule, those who have been in intelligence for many years have a wide range of contacts whereas those who are relatively new do not. However, much depends on the characteristic habits, and particular circumstances of the individuals involved.

2. Contacts are sometimes established through one or more of the intelligence community mechanisms--e.g., the USIB substantive committees, meetings of representatives on NIEs, coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency's daily and special issuances, various task teams set up from time to time, and the NIS program. But to a large extent, analysts develop their contacts on an individual basis, often on their own initiative and sometimes aided by suggestions from their predecessors, colleagues, or immediate superiors.

3. An analyst who wishes to communicate with an analyst in another agency has available to him a number of facilities to assist in effecting such communication. Most obvious, of course, is the telephone (black and gray). To supplement the telephone, there are secure teletype links between the agencies, and the LDX which connects NSA, the operation centers of CIA and State, and the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The analyst can also call upon established liaison services for assistance in establishing the desired contact.

4. Both the frequency and agency pattern of analyst-to-analyst communication vary markedly. For example, most INR offices tend to have more contact with CIA components than with DIA, some rarely consult with CIA analysts except those in OCI, and in a few instances it was said that the initiative was more often taken by OCI. In part, this pattern reflects the fact that interagency communication occurs more frequently for the purpose of exchanging views with opposite numbers on current intelligence matters relating to an analyst's primary field. When the purpose is getting timely information on matters outside of an analyst's primary field, the agencies and persons contacted vary considerably, depending on the particular subject in question.

5. The extent and frequency of analyst-to-analyst communication also vary markedly with the intensity of activity in a given area or subject and the interest shown in such activity by higher authority. When activity and interest are at a high pitch, as, for example, in the case of the Dominican Republic crisis, or with regard to Communist China,

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analyst-to-analyst communication takes place constantly. On the other hand, in areas or subjects which are quiescent, analyst-to-analyst communication may be very infrequent. This is, of course, perfectly normal behavior. It does, however, point up the fact that under circumstances in which analyst-to-analyst communication is important, present facilities do suffice to establish and maintain such communication, and conversely, in those instances where analyst-to-analyst communication is infrequent or absent, it is likely that such communication is not necessary, even though it may be in general terms, desirable.

6. Communication is usually by phone. In many cases there is insufficient time to go to another agency to discuss current developments and, when information is sought, it is typically needed very promptly. However, much depends on the habits of the individuals involved. Thus, a small proportion of the analysts make a point of meeting with their counterparts periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest, including current intelligence items, while others expressed the hope that circumstances would permit more informal exchange of ideas but felt that the pressure of work always interfered. The nature of an analyst's job also has a direct bearing on his communication practices. Economists, for example, tend to maintain contact with a large number of individuals in both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies, and to communicate with them by phone not so much because of the pressure of time but rather because that method is the most efficient way of getting bits and pieces from widely scattered sources.

7. Liaison arrangements tend to be used more for document procurement than for establishing contact with knowledgeable individuals in other agencies. In this connection, analysts felt that improvement was needed in facilities for rapid document transmission and some expressed the hope that the LDX system would eventually permit rapid transmission of facsimiles throughout the intelligence community. It was noted that analysts frequently need to see actual documents in order to discuss matters effectively over the phone, that reading excerpts from documents is often impractical, and that teletype transmission for this purpose is cumbersome.

D. Impediments to Analyst Communication

1. Although virtually every aspect of analyst-to-analyst communication can be improved in some respect, the Task Team found that existing practices were actually working better than was initially expected. The principal impediments appear to be the differences, and

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changes, in the organization structures of the intelligence agencies, difficulties in utilizing available secure communications facilities, and the pressure of work loads. A lesser impediment arises from security considerations discussed in paragraph 5.

2. Organizational differences complicate identifying appropriate officers in other agencies. INR is organized on a geographic basis; DIA's production element is organized both geographically and functionally; and CIA's production element is organized partly on a geographic basis and partly functionally. The Task Team found, for example, that analysts in INR and their geographically organized counterparts in CIA are for the most part well known to each other. Similarly, where DIA and CIA have comparable functional elements (e.g., the Military Economics Division in DIA and the Military Economic Research Area in CIA) the analysts know their counterparts and contact them directly whenever circumstances warrant doing so. They sometimes need assistance when their counterparts are not available, when they need to direct their inquiry through the chain of command, and when they seek information in fields which neither the analyst nor his counterpart follows in depth. Differences in organizational structure also make it difficult to determine who is the counterpart of a division or branch chief and whether there are several components of another agency that might profitably be contacted. Finally, the new analyst often needs assistance in identifying both his counterparts and sources of information in other agencies. The latter problem is essentially an internal matter, but the Task Team believes it would be useful to encourage agencies to invite officers from other departments to attend periodic briefings on their organization and functions.

3. The Task Team found that most analysts preferred to communicate by personal face-to-face discussion. There was agreement, however, that time and distance factors greatly limited the opportunities for personal meetings, and that reliance must be placed on mechanical means, primarily on the telephone. The ordinary black phone should not, of course, be used for any classified discussions or to transmit classified information; yet it is well known that the black phone is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters. On the other hand, the black phone system is the only system that is fully accessible to analysts. Moreover, the present, existing secure telephone systems are far more sophisticated than the analysts require under normal circumstances. Their needs for the most part can be met by some system that will enable communication no higher than SECRET. 25X1

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6. The Task Team has the impression, from its survey, that apart from the inadequacy of the existing telephone system, the greatest impediment to analyst-to-analyst communication is simply the work load and time factor. Again and again analysts acknowledged the desirability of more frequent consultation with their opposite numbers in other agencies, but confessed that they could not spare the time and effort.

7. In summary, the Task Team found that:

a. Present facilities and procedures do, in fact, enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with an analyst in another agency.

b. Present facilities and procedures, however, are in some instances, cumbersome, and time consuming; and the cumulative effect of these inadequacies does act as a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication.

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c. The two areas in which improvements should be sought are (1) means of identifying analysts by knowledgeability and areas of responsibility; (2) means of augmenting secure telephone or other types of oral communication facilities.

E. Possible Means of Improvement

1. Identification of Appropriate Analysts in Other Agencies

a. The Terms of Reference for Task Team VII directed it "to determine, inter alia, the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program for improvement." In its exploration of this matter, the Task Team made the following assumptions concerning such a directory service:

(1) The directory service would function in a manner analogous to a telephone information service rather than take the form of a published directory.

(2) The directory service would cover INR and the production elements of DIA and CIA. Because of security and other complications, NSA would not be included initially, nor would other production offices located outside the Washington area.

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(3) The Register would be organized on the basis of subject specialization, and show, for each subject, the appropriate analyst in each agency, his telephone number (gray and/or black), his organizational location and his office address.

(4) The analyst identified for each subject specialty would be the responsible analyst, rather than the most knowledgeable. In the great majority of cases, the responsible analyst is the most knowledgeable. The exceptions to this generalization would be extremely difficult to identify, and even when identified, there would remain administrative and perhaps security complications if an analyst in one agency were able to deal directly with the most knowledgeable but not responsible individual in another agency.

b. A number of problems arise in connection with a directory service of the general character indicated above.

(1) The directory will necessarily be organized by subject. There are, however, inconsistencies among the agencies as to nomenclature of subjects, and as to the degree to which subject fields

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are subdivided. It is possible, of course, to devise a subject breakdown for the proposed Register which would make provision for the variations among agencies, through cross references, special subdivisions, etc. The servicing of inquiries to the directory, however, would probably require an individual at least of junior professional grade who was thoroughly familiar with the details of the subject arrangements of the Register, and the internal organization of the agencies concerned.

(2) If it is to be useful, the directory must be kept current, not only in respect to reassignments of individuals, but also as to reorganizations in the agencies, changes in responsibilities, physical moves, and changes in telephone numbers. On the basis of the difficulties encountered in maintaining the normal telephone information service, which is concerned only with individuals on a name basis, it will be a formidable task to ensure the necessary discipline and promptness on the part of the various agencies in providing the needed data. Without such discipline and promptness, a directory service would lose much of its usefulness.

(3) A directory service as outlined in paragraph 1 above raises security problems both in CIA and DIA. Informal conversations with CIA's Office of Security indicate that, from a security point of view, approval would not be given to a directory service of the kind described above which would service all inquiries received on the unclassified (black) telephone. The alternatives appear to be (1) to provide service to inquiries on the gray (secure) phone only, and/or (2) to provide service only to specified points of contact in each of the agencies concerned. Either of these alternatives, or both, would in the view of the Task Team, considerably reduce the use of the directory service by analysts. All analysts who do not both possess the necessary special clearance and have access to a gray phone would be forced to go through third parties to obtain information from the directory service.

(4) The Task Team has attempted to arrive at a rough estimate of the cost of a directory service. The development of a suitable system of subject matter categories, the development of a satisfactory form to be used by the agencies in reporting their analysts both initially and on subsequent changes, and the collation and organization of the information, would, it is estimated, require the services of two professional and two clerical personnel for six months. Thereafter, the directory could be maintained and serviced by one professional and one clerical. Thus, in rough approximation, it will cost \$18,000 to establish a directory service, and \$18,000 per year to maintain and service it. Not included are indirect costs,

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F. Conclusions

On the basis of its surveys, investigations, and the considerations outlined in the previous paragraphs the Task Team has reached the following conclusions:

1. The variety of mechanisms presently existing provide a workable means for the establishment and maintenance of interagency analyst-to-analyst communication.
2. Liaison facilities can ensure--albeit, on occasion with some delay--that any analyst with a valid reason can identify and make contact with the appropriate analyst in another agency.
3. In total, present mechanisms and facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication are reasonably adequate; however, significant improvements could be made: (a) by providing more ready means for identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency; and (b) by providing additional secure telephone facilities for analyst-to-analyst consultation.
4. Augmentation of existing or planned KY-3 (green) telephone facilities in the Washington area would satisfy a significant portion of the present need for analyst-to-analyst communication facilities at reasonable cost.

G. Recommendations

The Task Team recommends:

1. That CIA, on a periodic basis, make available to other members of the intelligence community listings of its key analytical or production people, both area and functional.
2. That DIA and State make available to other members of the community increased numbers of their current telephone directories so as to make available one copy to each small group of analysts who work together.
3. That DIA, CIA and Department of State make available to each other, on a periodic basis, copies of their organization charts in sufficient detail to make evident the analytical capabilities of major units and subunits in the positive intelligence field.
4. That member agencies participating in the green secure voice communications system examine the locations of existing and planned

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KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communications capabilities.

5. That member agencies assure the continuing participation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of the people concerned with the development and installation of secure voice communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.

6. That development be continued on closed circuit television techniques such as those already initiated by the CIA Imagery Analysis Division, with particular attention to solving the security problems involved in using this technique between agencies, and that CIA serve as executive agent for this development.

7. That Task Team VII be dissolved.

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Attachment
USIB-D-39.7/22
7 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

SUBJECT : Vote Sheet Action

REFERENCE : USIB-D-39.7/22, 7 August 1967

1. With respect to the Recommendations in Section D, page 5 of the CODIB report attached to the reference:

a. I concur therein. _____

b. I concur therein, subject to the comments or amendments set forth in paragraph 2 below.* _____

c. I do not concur in the recommendations. See comments below.*

2. Comments or amendments:*

(Signature)

(Title)

(Agency)

(Date)

*May necessitate classification and control of this memorandum.